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This paper investigates the relationship between energy-price shocks and three core
measures of inflation in a vector autoregression model that incorporates measures of monetary
policy and inflation expectations.  The sample set includes data at monthly frequencies from
1980 through 2000.  We find that that positive energy-price shocks have significant, though
small, effects on all core price measures after a lag of 12 to 18 months, but that negative
shocks have no discernable impact.  The results suggest that relative energy-price changes do
not distort the inflation signals that standard core-price measures provide.
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1.  Introduction
Standard price indexes are imperfect measures of inflation because they cannot
distinguish between price movements resulting from excessive money growth and those
stemming from relative price shocks or taxes.  A central bank that does not correctly
interpret movements in broad price indexes might undertake inappropriate policies and,
thereby, convert a fairly innocuous relative price shock into a more profound and
persistent economic adjustment.  Since Bohi (1986), many economists have claimed that
the depressing real macroeconomic effects of oil-price hikes prior to 1980 stemmed not
from the direct impacts of higher oil prices, but from the monetary tightening that often
accompanied them.  
Standard core-price measures, which typically remove volatile food and energy
components from headline price indexes, may provide only a limited remedy to this
problem because changes in the relative price of non-core elements, like energy, might
subsequently pass through to the core components.  Other core-price measures, such as
the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s (FRBC) median consumer price index, attempt
to minimize these pass-through problems but may not be totally immune from the
pervasive effects of relative energy-price changes.  
In this paper, we attempt to measure the impact of relative energy-price changes
on three common core measures of inflation: 1) the methodologically consistent
consumer price index (CPI) less food and energy, 2) the deflator for personal
consumption expenditures (PCE) less food and energy, and 3) a methodologically
consistent median CPI.
1  Although PCE and CPI use much of the same basic Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) price data, these indexes differ in their coverage and weighting2
schemes (e.g., Clark, 1999).  Hence, energy shocks could affect the core CPI and core
PCE differently.  The median CPI is constructed by arraying the price changes for CPI
components, repeating specific components according to their weight in the total index,
and selecting the middle value (e.g., Bryan, Cecchetti, and Smiley, 1999).  Because a
relative price shock will have a smaller impact on the median price change than the mean,
the median CPI conceptually offers a cleaner measure of inflation.    
We find that energy-price shocks have asymmetric effects on core-price
measures.  Positive shocks have a significant, though small, effect on all of the core-price
measures after a lag of 12 to 18 months, while negative shocks have no discernable
impact on any of the core-price measures.  Despite substantial methodological
differences, our findings are similar to those of Hooker (1999).  In section 2 of this paper,
we review some ongoing controversies about the macroeconomic effects of energy-price
shocks and explain how they influenced our modeling strategy.  In section 3, we present a
six-variable VAR model for each of the three core-price measures.  These models directly
incorporate inflation expectations and monetary policy.  In section 4, we provide the
standard model diagnostics and present impulse-response functions associated with 20-
percentage-point, orthogonal, energy-price shocks.  In section 5, we compare our results
to Hooker (1999) and explain some broader implications of the model for ongoing
debates about energy-price shocks and macroeconomic activity.  
2.  Oil Prices and the Macroeconomy
A voluminous literature analyzing macroeconomic effects of oil-price shocks has
developed since the initial Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ (OPEC)3
embargo of 1973.  Hamilton (2000) and Hamilton and Herrar (2000) contain fairly
comprehensive sets of references.  Almost all of these studies focus on the connection
between oil prices and real economic variables.  Although our study takes a different,
narrower tack, persistent debates within the broader literature influenced our modeling
strategy.  
Central to most controversies is evidence of a structural break in the relationship
between oil prices and macroeconomic variables in the early 1980s.  Prior to this time, oil
prices seemed to be exogenous and to Granger-cause output; after the break, oil prices
appear to be endogenous, and their relationship to the real economy is ambiguous (e.g.,
Hamilton 1983, 1996, and Hooker 1996).  
Since Morke (1989), many researchers have attributed the structural break to
fundamental changes in the behavior of oil prices themselves.  Before 1980, oil-price
changes were by and large unidirectional.  The Texas Railroad Commission and OPEC
had cartelized much of the oil market, and as a consequence, oil prices rarely fell (e.g.,
Hamilton, 1983).  By the middle of 1980, however, the price of West Texas Intermediate
(WTI) crude oil began to decline.  Between 1986 and 1997, WTI prices generally
fluctuated between $15 and $22 per barrel, except for a brief spike in late 1990.  Since
1998, oil prices have risen beyond $22 per barrel, and they have demonstrated sharp
swings.  
The changing behavior of oil prices could create the early 1980s structural break
in econometric estimates of their relationship with macroeconomic variables, if oil price
increases and decreases have asymmetric economic effects.  Many researchers have
argued that the deleterious economic effects of oil-price hikes may be substantially4
stronger than the favorable economic effects of oil-price declines.  All oil-price changes
can induce sectoral reallocations and create uncertainties about the returns to irreversible
investments, but oil price decreases, unlike increases, have positive real income (terms-
of-trade) effects that offset these negative impacts.  To deal with this phenomenon, many
time-series modelers include nonlinear, asymmetric oil-price specifications (e.g.,
Hamilton, 2000, and references therein).  
A second explanation for the structural break in the relationship between oil
prices and real macroeconomic variables focuses on changes in the Federal Reserve’s
reaction to energy-price shocks.  According to this argument, energy-price changes exert
a relatively small direct effect on the economy, but the Federal Reserve’s response to
these changes can appreciably magnify or dampen their propagation.  In the 1970s, oil-
price shocks occurred in an inflationary environment.  The Federal Reserve either had
already tightened (1972-1973) prior to the energy-price shock or tightened in response to
the energy-price shock (1979).  This correspondence accentuated the negative real
economic impact of higher energy prices.  In 1973, the Federal Reserve subsequently
reversed policy as economic activity weakened, and over the next four years often
accommodated higher oil prices with federal funds rate cuts.  This policy generated an
inflation, which the public associated higher oil prices.  Inflation expectations became
associated with oil-price shocks.  After Volcker became chairman, policy quickly focused
on eliminating inflation, and the Federal Reserve altered its operational procedure.  Since
that time, the Federal Reserve has credibly committed to long-term price stability, and it
has not responded to oil-price shocks.  Consequently, inflation expectations no longer
track oil-price changes as closely as they did in the early 1980s.  5
Empirical studies disagree about the extent to which the Federal Reserve’s policy
responses explain the relationship between oil prices and real economic variables.  The
relevant literature includes: Bohi (1986), Dotsey and Reid (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and
Watson (1997), Brown and Yucel (1999), and Hamilton and Herrera (2000).  
Three aspects of our model stem from the debates on the nature of the structural
break:  First, we restrict our sample to the post-1980 period to avoid possible problems
stemming from estimating a VAR across data containing a structural break.  We are not
interested in explaining this break.  Second, we split our energy-price variable into
positive and negative components to allow for possible asymmetries in the response to
energy-price shocks.  Third, we include the federal funds rate and variables to control
directly for endogenous monetary-policy changes.  The next section elaborates on the
model.  
3.  The VAR Model Specification
To analyze the impacts of energy prices on each of the core-price measures, we
estimate a recursive VAR using monthly data from 1980:1 to 2000:12.  The model has
the following standard form:
t i t
i




0 .   (1)
In equation 1, A0 is a vector of intercept terms; Tt is a vector of exogenous time trends; Ai
are matrices of coefficients; xt-i are vectors of the lagged variables in the system, and et is
a vector of contemporaneous disturbances.  The error vector, et, is a linear combination of
the underlying structural errors.  Each element of et has a zero mean and a constant
variance, and each is individually serially uncorrelated.  The elements of et, however, are6
contemporaneously correlated.  The vector xt consists of the subsequent six terms in the
following order:
1)  Positive log changes in a measure of energy prices, either the CPI energy
component or the PCE energy component  
2)  Negative log changes in the respective energy-price component  
3)  Log changes in a core measure of inflation, either the methodologically
consistent CPI less food and energy, the methodologically consistent median
CPI, or the PCE less food and energy  
4)  The log change in industrial production as a measure of economic activity
generating a demand for energy  
5)  Expectations of inflation over the next 12 months as measured by the
Michigan Survey of Consumer Sentiments  
6)  The federal funds rate as a measure of monetary policy.  
We maintained this ordering in the Choleski decompositions.  In each of the three
estimated systems, we use the energy-price component that most closely corresponds to
the core price measure.  
We include a measure of inflation expectations because of their importance to the
formulation of monetary policy and in the monetary transmission mechanism.  (Inflation
expectations consistently Granger-cause federal funds rate changes in our VARs.)
Energy-price shocks in the 1970s and early 1980s allegedly heightened inflation
expectations, but the positive relationship weakened in the 1980s and vanished in the
1990s.  Consequently, to capture any possible direct monetary response to energy-price
shocks, one must separately control for any independent relationship between monetary7
policy and inflation expectations.  Moreover, if only real, unanticipated federal funds rate
changes affect economic variables, allowing for the interaction of a nominal federal funds
rate and inflation expectations within the system of equations seems especially
important.
2  
We include an exogenous time trend to control for a steady pattern of energy
conservation over our sample period.  According to annual Department of Energy data,
the energy needed to produce a unit of real GDP has steadily declined by nearly one-half
since the early 1970s.  The exogenous time trend is statistically significant at the 5% level
or higher for the positive energy price equation in each of the three systems that we
estimated.  It is also weakly significant with a p-value of 6% in the core price equations
of each system.  Otherwise the exogenous time trend is not statistically significant.  
The sample period runs from 1980:1 to 2000:12 with observations at a monthly
frequency.  Although, as is typical in VAR models, formal tests favored a shorter lag
structure, we allow for 18 lags in the monthly data to stay consistent with the lag
structures typically found in empirical studies that use quarterly data.  Hamilton and
Herrera (2000) emphasize the pivotal role that lag length can play in VAR analysis of oil
shocks and point out shortcomings of lag-length tests.  
4. Causality, Variance Decomposition, and Impulse Response Functions
4.1 Granger Causality, Block Exogeneity, and Variance Decomposition 
Our objective is to estimate the standard form model and then to calculate impulse
response functions showing the impact of exogenous energy-price shocks on core-price
measures.  To do so, we must first determine that each of the variables has a causal8
relationship with the others in the system and then check that the ordering of variables in
Choleski decomposition does not affect our results.  
Table 1 presents p-values from Granger-causality and block-exogeneity tests for
each of the variables in all three VAR systems.  The tests’ likelihood-ratio statistics have
2 χ  distributions, with 18 degrees of freedom for the Granger-causality tests and 90
degrees of freedom for the block-exogeneity tests.  Although shown in table 1, Granger-
causality tests are of limited usefulness in a VAR system.  They describe bilateral
relationships between independent and dependent variables in a single equation, holding
all else constant, but even if a specific independent variable does not Granger cause a
particular dependent variable, it may still influence that same dependent variable through
its interaction with the other variables in the system.  Block-exogeneity tests generalize
Granger causality, indicating whether the lagged independent variables jointly affect a
particular dependent variable.  Neither test, however, considers contemporaneous
interactions between variables.  
We can reject the null hypothesis of block exogeneity for all variables except
positive energy-price changes in the median-CPI (p-value = 18.5%) and the core-PCE
equations (p-value = 64.4%), which was not especially surprising, and for industrial
production in the core-CPI (p-value = 5.9%) and the core-PCE equations (p-value =
14.5%).   Although these exceptional cases suggest that the variable in question is
exogenous to the system, we did not impose the restrictions on the sytem that block-
exogeneity tests suggested.  In the case of industrial production, the test results were only
marginally insignificant in the core-CPI system (p-value = 5.9%).  In the case of positive
energy-price shocks, bilateral Granger causality test suggest that this variable is not9
exogenous in the median CPI system.  We continued to estimate each of the three VARs
using ordinary least squares even though the causality tests suggest that we lose
efficiency from not imposing zero-restraints on the core-PCE equations and estimating
that system with seeming-unrelated-regression techniques.  
We did, however, ordered the variables in the system with positive energy shocks
first in all cases.  This is tantamount to restricting the system so that the other variables
do not have a contemporaneous affect on positive oil shocks, but it still allows for lagged
interactions.  Some such restrictions are, of course, necessary for identification.  We also
experimented with the placement of industrial production (and other variables), but found
that changing their order in the system, which potentially can affect the impulse-response
functions (and the variance decompositions), had no noticeable affect on the results.
3  
Table 2 presents the 12-month variance decomposition for each of the three
systems.  Positive and negative energy prices, industrial production, and, to a lesser
extent, core-price measures each explains most of its own forecast-error variance.
Positive energy-price shocks account for a considerable amount of the forecast-error
variation in the core CPI and the core PCE, but a substantially smaller proportion of the
variation in the median CPI.  Positive energy-price shocks also account for slightly more
than 9% of the forecast-error variation in the negative energy price equation, but this is
smaller that the standard deviation of the forecast-error.  A similar, though smaller,
relationship holds for negative energy-price shocks in the positive energy-price equation.  10
4.2 Impulse-Response Functions
Our impulse response functions indicate that none of the core-price measures are
strongly affected by energy-price shocks.  At most, energy-price shocks have small
asymmetric effects on core-price measures follow a lag of at least one year.  Energy-price
shocks themselves exhibit a small amount of persistence with a small negative offset to
positive shocks after a half-year lag.  
We separately introduced positive and negative orthogonal energy-price shocks to
each of the three core-price VAR systems for a total of six experiments.  The magnitude
of each shock was 20 percentage points, which approximately equals the mean plus 1½
standard deviations for changes in both the CPI and the PCE energy-price series.  (The
mean change in both energy-price series is approximately 7 percentage points.)  We
report only: 1) the impulse response functions characterizing the reaction of the three
core-price measures to separate positive and negative orthogonal energy-price shocks;
and 2) the impulse response functions showing the response of negative energy prices to
positive energy-price shocks and positive energy prices to negative energy-price shocks.  
Consistent with much of the broader macroeconomic literature on energy shocks,
we find that energy-price shocks exert asymmetric effects.  As reported in figure 1
(panels 3 through 6), a one-time, orthogonal, 20-percentage-point negative shock does
not appear to have a significant effect on the methodologically consistent core CPI, the
methodologically consistent median CPI or the PCE.   (The solid lines in each of the six
panels of figure 1 trace out the impulse response functions, while the dashed lines show
plus or minus two standard deviations around that response).  An orthogonal 20-
percentage-point positive shock, however, increases the core CPI by approximately 0.411
percentage point after 12 months, and it increases the median CPI by approximately 0.2
percentage point after 15 months (figure 1, panels 1 through 3).  The same shock
increases the PCE deflator by approximately 0.6 percentage point after 17 months.
Although significant, these effects are rather small and appear only after a substantial
time lag.  The substantially smaller impact on the median CPI probably reflects its
different construction.  
We also examined how each of the energy-price components—positive and
negative—responds to its own orthogonal shock and to that of the other energy-price
component.  (Because interactions between the positive and negative PCE energy
component were identical to those of the CPI energy component, we report only the
impulse response functions, plus or minus two standard deviations in the four panels of
figure 2.)  The results show that both the positive and negative shocks persist for one
month before dying out in the third month (panels 1 and 3).  In addition, negative energy
shocks show some evidence of an echo equal to 5 percentage points after a lag of five to
six months (panel 4), suggesting that negative shocks followed negative shocks between
1980 and 2000.  
We also find evidence of a negative offset to positive energy-price shocks.  In
panel 2 of figure 2, a 5.8 percentage point negative energy price response follows a 20-
percentage-point orthogonal positive energy-price shock after 14 months in our sample.
A similar positive offset does not follow a negative energy-price shock.  In addition, each
energy-price series demonstrates a small, but marginally significant, response two to
three months immediately after a shock to the other series (panels 2 and 4).  Since a
shock to each series shows persistence for one month and because when one series takes12
a nonzero value the other is zero, we believe that any correlation in period two results
because the associated zero value falls below a series’ average.  This would create the
negative correlation in period two.  The small significant response in the negative energy-
price series in period three, however, may not reflect this phenomenon (panel 2).  
The energy-price measures considered in this paper are themselves composites of
different types of energy prices, including gasoline and piped gas and electricity.  The
components are all positively correlated with each other and with the overall energy-price
index, but the correlation coefficients between some components can be low.  Because
core measures of inflation could respond differently to shocks in the more basic energy-
price components, we also considered the effects of orthogonal shocks to these sub-
indexes.
4  We found that positive and negative shocks to individual components generally
had no effect on the core-price measures.  (We do not present these results).  This is not
surprising, given that the overall effect of an energy-price shock is small.  We also found,
however, that shocks to individual components exhibited stronger offset effects,
particularly positive to negative, than the overall energy-price measures.  
Energy-price shocks do not appear to affect industrial production or the federal
funds rate in our model, but they do have an asymmetric impact on inflation expectations
in each of the models.  Positive energy-price shocks do not seem to affect expectations,
but negative energy-price shocks consistently lower inflation expectations by 0.1 to 0.2
percentage point with a lag of one month.  (In the CPI model only, negative energy-price
shocks also lower inflation expectations by 0.2 percentage point with lags of three and
four months.)  We offer an interpretation of these events in the next section.  13
5.  A Conclusion, a Comparison, an Interpretation
Our VAR analysis finds that since 1980, changes in energy prices do not seriously
distort the inflation signals that standard core-price measures provide.  Positive impulses
have had only a small pass-through effect after a lag of approximately 12 to 18 months.
Negative energy-price shocks have had no apparent effect on core-price measures.  These
results are similar to those of Hooker (1999), who concludes that after 1980, energy-price
shocks exerted a negligible effect on core prices and influenced headline price measures
primarily in accordance with their weight in the overall index.
5  We found a small amount
of persistence (two months) in energy-price shocks, which could compound their impact
on headline price measures.  
Hooker (1999) investigates the effects of energy-price shocks on the core CPI,
core PCE, and the GDP deflator using quarterly data and a Phillips curve approach.  We
find that his results are robust to variation in our estimation technique, dissimilarities in
the other independent variables contained in the core-price equations, and differences in
the frequency of our observations.  We differ from Hooker in that we find somewhat
more evidence of asymmetric pass-through effects from positive and negative energy-
price shocks than he does.
6  Although we have not tested it, we suspect that positive and
negative energy-price shocks affect mark-up strategies differently:  Positive energy-price
shocks initiate mark-ups, but negative energy shocks do not prompt discounting.  
We did not intend to investigate ongoing debates about the broader connections
between energy prices and real macroeconomic variables, but our finding offers an
interpretation of the relationships.  We find that orthogonal positive (and negative)
energy-price shocks do not affect the federal funds rate in our equation systems, even14
though the impulse response functions allow energy-price shocks to affect monetary
policy indirectly through their interactions with inflation expectations and industrial
production.  We find that positive energy-price impulses have no direct effect on inflation
expectations, while negative price shocks tend to lower inflationary expectations very
slightly in all three of the equation systems.  We find that energy-price shocks—positive
and negative—had no discernable effect on industrial production between 1980 and 2000.
These results suggest: 1) that absent a monetary-policy response, the business-cycle
effects of energy-price shocks are fairly benign (e.g., Hooker 1996 and Hamilton, 1996);
and 2) that because energy price have not seriously affected output or inflation, the
Federal Reserve has not responded to them since 1980.  Understanding the Federal
Reserve’s reaction function may be the key to understanding how energy prices impact
the economy.  15
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Table 1:  Pairwise Granger Causality and Block Exogeneity Tests
(P-values for appropriate tests)







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  0.0003 0.0229 0.4754 0.8332 0.9348
Energy -  0.0404 0.4097 0.8849 0.0100 0.0392
Core prices 0.3429 0.2324 0.3507 0.1480 0.6157
Ind. prod. 0.2349 0.0141 0.6004 0.9056 0.0131
Expectations 0.0652 0.0132 0.2226 0.8679 0.0037
Fed funds 0.0474 0.0476 0.2104 0.5183 0.5943
Block Exog.  0.0343 0.0000 0.0085 0.0590 0.0002 0.0000







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  0.0002 0.0671 0.7055 0.6247 0.8653
Energy -  0.0689 0.3152 0.9339 0.0117 0.0438
Core prices 0.8845 0.3589 0.9010 0.0388 0.5178
Ind. prod. 0.3341 0.1493 0.3055 0.8665 0.0007
Expectations 0.0722 0.0019 0.2509 0.7947 0.0004
Fed funds 0.0046 0.0594 0.4018 0.6532 0.1842
Block Exog.  0.1850 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  0.0000 0.0153 0.4433 0.4652 0.8185
Energy -  0.2976 0.4944 0.9659 0.1052 0.1016
Core prices 0.9603 0.2424 0.7224 0.0200 0.7540
Ind. prod. 0.3552 0.1083 0.2016 0.9665 0.0004
Expectations 0.3072 0.0492 0.6959 0.5530 0.0008
Fed funds 0.4629 0.2900 0.2373 0.2343 0.7508
Block Exog.  0.6436 0.0002 0.0024 0.1445 0.0000 0.000017
Table 2:  Variance Decomposition 
(Percentage of 12-month error variance)







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  65.9 9.29 12.0 7.0 9.8 1.6
Energy -  7.6 63.6 5.7 2.9 21.2 1.3
Core prices 5.0 1.5 69.3 10.6 9.0 2.7
Ind. prod. 5.8 14.0 4.0 72.0 12.5 63.0
Expectations 7.8 6.8 6.3 2.4 43.7 7.0
Fed funds 7.8 4.8 2.7 5.2 3.7 24.4
Std. Error  15.5 14.7 1.5 8.1 0.5 1.4







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  66.6 9.8 4.5 6.4 12.9 4.5
Energy -  7.8 61.7 5.6 2.8 20.8 2.2
Core prices 3.5 8.1 69.8 3.7 4.4 0.1
Ind. prod. 5.1 10.3 5.9 76.1 13.1 68.9
Expectations 7.6 4.9 5.7 4.0 42.0 0.2
Fed funds 9.3 5.1 8.6 6.9 6.9 24.0
Std. Error  15.8 14.9 1.0 8.2 0.5 1.3







Ind. Prod. Expectations Fed
funds
Energy +  70.9 9.1 12.8 8.2 10.9 3.4
Energy -  6.5 59.4 4.1 3.1 3.6 1.2
Core prices 5.8 12.0 67.3 5.4 34.5 10.7
Ind. prod. 4.7 8.3 3.1 72.1 10.3 56.3
Expectations 6.9 8.3 3.9 3.8 33.8 1.3
Fed funds 5.1 3.0 8.8 7.4 6.9 27.0
Std. Error 16.0 14.8 1.9 8.1 0.6 1.318
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1  The methodologically consistent CPI and median CPI avoid discontinuities in the price
series resulting from changes in the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) techniques for
constructing the CPI.  Because such changes could affect existing contracts, the BLS
does not alter previously published CPI values to conform to revised methodology.  The
BLS, however, maintains a methodologically consistent CPI series.  The choice of these
alternative series could affect empirical work.
2  Controlling for expectations might also solve the Sims (1992) price puzzle in monetary
VAR models because expectations could capture information about future inflations not
revealed elsewhere in the model.
3  The contemporaneous cross-correlations among the error terms were generally low.
We altered the ordering of variables with cross correlation coefficient greater than 0.2,
but we found no appreciable effect on the results.
4 We looked at the following subindexes of the CPI (their correlations with the CPI
research energy component are in parentheses): Fuels and utilities (0.54), fuels (0.59),
fuel oil and other fuels (0.59), piped gas and electricity (0.38), motor fuel (0.95), and
gasoline (0.95). The components of the energy-price measures were not available on a
methodologically consistent basis.
5  Hooker (1999) found that prior to 1980, energy-price shocks affected core-price
measures.  He attributes this to the response of monetary policy at the time.
6  Hooker (1999) concludes that a structural break in 1980:QII better fits the data than do
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